Washington Law Review
Volume 70

Number 1

1-1-1995

Bravo v. Dolsen Cos.: Shoring Up Employer Bargaining Power by
Sandbagging Nonunion Workers
Peter B. Gonick

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter B. Gonick, Notes and Comments, Bravo v. Dolsen Cos.: Shoring Up Employer Bargaining Power by
Sandbagging Nonunion Workers, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 203 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol70/iss1/6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright 0 1995 by Washington Law Review Association

BRAVO v. DOLSEN COS.: SHORING UP EMPLOYER
BARGAINING POWER BY SANDBAGGING NONUNION
WORKERS
Peter B. Gonick
Abstract: In Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., the Washington Court of Appeals held that the public
policy provision of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act applied only in cases involving
union activity, thus depriving nonunion workers of protection from discharge for engaging in
concerted activities. This Note argues that the court misconstrued both the public policy
provision and Washington case law to reach a result contrary to sound labor policy and
federal interpretations of a similar act. It suggests an alternative interpretation of the public
policy provision that provides adequate protection for workers to engage in concerted
activities.

Jose Israel Bravo worked in a dairy.' During the summer of 1990, he
and other milkers became dissatisfied with the conditions under which
they worked. The milkers met and chose a representative to speak to
their employer about wages, medical coverage, the denial of lunch and
rest breaks, and better treatment from the dairy managers. When the
dairy management refused to discuss these issues with the representative,
the milkers decided to go on strike.
Unfortunately for Bravo and his fellow milkers, management at the
dairy declared that anyone who did not show up for work was
immediately fired. Despite Bravo working his shift later that day, the
dairy discharged him along with the other striking milkers. Dairy
managers did not give the striking workers an opportunity to discuss
their demands, stating that plenty of replacement workers were available.
The dairy refused to reinstate the striking workers, even when vacancies
occurred after the strike. The dairy management based its refusal to
rehire the workers on their participation in the strike and an employer's
ability, under the employment-at-will doctrine, to discharge employees
for any reason.
According to the court of appeals in Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., the dairy
managers had done nothing illegal in firing the workers and refusing to
reinstate them.3 Although the public policy provision of Washington's

1. The facts for this scenario are taken from Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 71 Wash. App. 769, 771, 862
P.2d 623, 625 (1993), reviewgranted,124 Wash. 2d 1001 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 778, 862 P.2d at 629.
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little Norris-LaGuardia Act protects the concerted activities of workers,4
the court of appeals held that the law applied only to discharges of
employees based on union activities.5 The Bravo court distinguished
Bravo's situation because case law declaring discharges illegal had
always addressed situations involving union activity.6
Part I of this Note examines Washington state labor law, including
statutory authority and case law. Additionally, Part I examines federal
authority, insofar as it affects Washington's interpretations of its own
state law and summarizes the issues and holding in Bravo. Part II
criticizes Bravo as contrary to Washington statutes and case law, as well
as inconsistent with federal authority and sound labor policy. Finally,
Part III suggests an appropriate interpretation of the public policy
provision of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act.
I.

WASHINGTON LABOR LAW

Washington state labor law is governed by common law and statutory
labor regulations. Although state law does not specifically protect
concerted activities of workers, such as going on strike, Washington's
little Norris-LaGuardia Act7 contains a public policy provision which
recognizes the necessity of concerted action in order for workers to
achieve more equal bargaining positions with employers!
Early
Washington cases have interpreted this provision to grant substantive
rights to employees to be free from employer interference in choosing
and joining unions.' Additionally, interpretations of the National Labor

4. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994). The Act is so named because it is based on the federal
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
5. Bravo, 71 Wash. App. at 777, 862 P.2d at 629.
6. Id. at 775-76, 862 P.2d at 628.
7. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32 (1994). The little Norris-LaGuardia Act is art anti-injunction statute,
which prohibits the courts of the state from enjoining the labor organizations and concerted activities
of workers, such as strikes. Id. Before the enactment of the statute, employers had often enlisted the
aid of the courts to prevent strikes and picketing. See City of Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 94
P.2d 180 (1939) (recognizing line of cases holding peaceful picketing to lie unlawful to have no
authority after enactment of little Norris-LaGuardia Act); Robert F. Koretz, Statutory History of the
UnitedStates:Labor Organization162 (1970).
8. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
9. E.g., Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965); International Union of Operating
Eng'rs Local No. 286 v. Sand Point Country Club, 83 Wash. 2d 498, 519 P.2d 985 (1974).
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Relations Act ("NLRA'), ° a federal statute granting similar rights, do
not deny nonunion workers this protection."
A.

Washington Statutory Authority

Washington State labor law is governed by common law doctrine and
the Revised Code of Washington ("RCW") Labor Regulations Title. 2
The title covers areas such as industrial health and safety, 3 minimum
wages, 4 and discrimination."5 These laws apply only to labor regulations
not preempted by the NLRA. 16 Because the NLRA is much more
comprehensive than state law, in most labor disputes employees in the
state look to the NLRA to protect their rights. 7 More particularly, while
the NLRA contains various provisions regarding the protection of
concerted activities of workers, 8 Washington law does not specifically
protect the concerted activities of many workers. However, the NLRA
specifically exempts some workers, including agricultural workers, from
its scope.19 Therefore, agricultural workers and other workers not
covered by the NLRA20 must rely solely on state law for protection when
engaging in concerted activities.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
11. E.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
12. Wash. Rev. Code. § 49 (1994).
13. Id. § 49.17.
14. Id. § 49.46.
15. Id. § 49.60.
16. See, e.g., Shane v. Greyhound Lines, 868 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that state cause
of action was entirely displaced by § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act); Krystad v. Lau, 65
Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (applying state law only because NLRA did not apply). The
NLRA was amended in 1947 and reenacted as the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 29
U.S.C. §§ 141(a), 142 (1988). For the sake of clarity, however, this Note will hereafter use "NLRA"
when referring to this statute.
17. See, eg., Beaman v. Yakima Valley Disposal, Inc., 116 Wash. 2d 697, 705, 712, 807 P.2d
849, 853, 857 (1991) (holding that wrongful discharge claim preempted by NLRA because dispute
arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA); Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees, Local 8 v.
Jensen, 51 Wash. App. 676, 679, 754 P.2d 1277, 1280 (1988) (holding state law claim preempted
because "arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA") (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,242-245 (1959)).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) (protecting rights of employees as to organization, collective
bargaining, etc.); § 158 (describing unfair labor practices); § 163 (preserving right to strike).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988) (excluding agricultural laborers from definition of employee for the
purposes of the provisions of the Act); DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1951) (finding agricultural workers not covered by the NLRA), cert. denied,342 U.S. 869 (1951).
20. For example, workers in the domestic service, independent contractors, and supervisors are all
explicitly excluded from the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
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Although Washington law does not specifically protect a worker's
right to engage in concerted activities, the public policy of the state
evinces a concern for safeguarding the bargaining position of the
worker. 1 The public policy provision, enacted as part of Washington's
little Norris-LaGuardia Act,'
specifically recognizes that the
unorganized worker lacks an effective bargaining position and declares
that workers should be free to associate or to decline to associate with
fellow workers in organizing themselves and in designating
representatives.'
The provision further prohibits employers from
interfering with workers' organizing, designating representatives, or
engaging in other concerted activities.24
B.

Washington CaseLaw InterpretingStatute

The Washington Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, interpreted
Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act's public policy provision to
grant substantive rights to workers to engage in concerted activities
without fear of reprisal, despite the statute's lack of a specific grant of
such rights.' This decision has been reaffirmed by courts that have
found that the public policy provision prohibits employers from
interfering with their employees' designation of representatives and

21. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
22. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32 (1994).
23. Id. § 49.32.020.
24. Id. The provision in its entirety reads:
In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the
courts of the state of Washington as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and
limited, the public policy of the state of Washington is hereby declared as follows:
Whereas, Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental
authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and othar forms of ownership
association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terrrs and conditions of his
employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protections; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and
authority of the courts of the state of Washington are hereby enacted.
Id.
25. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827,400 P.2d 72 (1965).
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organization into unions.26 These courts, however, have limited the
scope of the public policy provision to protect only the right of
employees to gain more effective bargaining positions, declining to
require employers to engage in good faith negotiations.27
1.

The Krystad Decision

The first case in Washington to rule on whether the public policy
provision granted substantive rights to workers was Krystad v. Lau.28 In
Krystad, the Washington Supreme Court held that the public policy
provision of the little Norris-LaGuardia Act granted substantive rights to
employees. Thus, employers could not interfere with their workers'
efforts to organize themselves for bargaining purposes.2 9 The Krystad
court specifically held illegal the discharge of four employees of a
professional laundry for joining a union, stating that Washington's little
Norris-LaGuardia Act conferred actionable rights on employees,
including the rights to be free from interference in organizing a union
and in designating that union as their bargaining agent. 30 The Krystad
employees, not covered by the NLRA,3' had resorted to state law for
their claim of interference with joining a union. 2
In reaching its conclusion that state law protected the laundry workers,
the court stated that it was merely effectuating the legislative intent
expressed in the plain language of the statute.33 The court also found
26. See, e.g., Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union, Local No. 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91
Wash. 2d 353, 588 P.2d 1334 (1979); International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 286 v.
Sand Point Country Club, 83 Wash. 2d 498, 519 P.2d 985 (1974).
27. SandPoint,83 Wash. 2d at 502,519 P.2d at 988.
28. 65 Wash. 2d 827,400 P.2d 72 (1965).
29. Id. at 846, 400 P.2d at 83.
30. Id. The employer in Krystad, who had a personal animosity towards unions due to their
discriminatory actions toward him when he was younger, had clearly stated that his reason for
discharging the employees was that they had joined a union. Id. at 828, 400 P.2d at 73.
31. The employees were not covered by the NLRA because the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") had determined that enterprises such as the one at issue in Krystad, with sales under
$500,000, were excluded from the Act. Id. at 831,400 P.2d at 75. The NLRB is a body created by
the NLRA to hear and decide labor disputes. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988). The decisions of the NLRB
are appealable to federal circuit courts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1988). The NLRB initially decides
whether it has jurisdiction in a particular case, and it has the power to decline jurisdiction for
enterprises not within the scope of the NLRA. These include enterprises which the NLRB believes
do not affect interstate commerce sufficiently to justify federal power over the States. 29 U.S.C. §
164(c) (1988).
32. Krystad, 65 Wash. 2d at 830-31,400 P.2d at 74-75.
33. Id. at 844,400 P.2d at 82. The court did not address the question of legislative history to the
statute, perhaps because the legislative history to Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act gives no
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support for its position in a Wisconsin state court decision. While
acknowledging the scant authority directly addressing interpretations of
the public policy provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 34 the court
found persuasive the reasoning in Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation
of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Manufacturing Co.35 In that case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the public policy section of its little
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which was nearly identical to Washington's
provision,36 conferred substantive rights on employees.37 The Simplex
Shoe court held that the employer had acted contrary to Wisconsin's
public policy section in threatening to close its factory if the employers
joined a union.3" The Wisconsin Supreme Court later reaffirmed its
interpretation when it declared that the public policy section was
inconsistent with allowing closed-shop agreements.39 The Krystad court
noted that there were no further Wisconsin decisions construing the
public policy provision, attributing this absence to the enactment of a
comprehensive labor relations statute in that state.40
substantive indications of the policy behind its enactment See Wa;hington House Journal,
Extraordinary Session, 23rd Legislature (1933); Senate House Journal, Extraordinary Session, 23rd
Legislature (1933). The federal Act upon which it was based, however, was primarily motivated by
a desire to overturn U.S. Supreme Court decisions such as Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1921). See Koretz, supra note 7, at 162. Many organizers and supporters of the NorrisLaGuardia Act felt that the Duplex Printingdecision's limitation of the Clayton Act's anti-injunction
provision to disputes between employers and employees eviscerated the Clayton Act, contrary to the
intent of Congress. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was then passed to support labor organizations, to
encourage collective bargaining, and to declare specifically that labor disputes were to be defined
broadly. The Act was cast in terms of an anti-injunction statute in order to lake power away from the
courts who had earlier defeated the purpose of the Clayton Act. Koretz, supra note 7, at 162-63.
See also Senate, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert Wagner), reprinted in
Koretz, supra note 7, at 314-16 (outlining judicial hostility to labor organizations and courts'
limitations of congressional statutes designed to aid labor).
34. Krystad, 65 Wash. 2d at 837,400 P.2d at 78.
35. 256 N.W. 56 (Wis. 1934).
36. Wisconsin's public policy provision is essentially the same as Washington's, although
Wisconsin's statute contains additional language that "[n]egotiation of terms and conditions of labor
should result from voluntary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental authority
has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate mid other forms of capital
control." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 103.51 (West 1988).
37. Simplex Shoe, 256 N.W. at 60-61.
38. Id.
39. American Furniture Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers General Local No. 200, 268
N.W. 250 (Wis. 1936). A closed-shop agreement is one in which employees must join a particular
union in order to work at a particular business. Patrick Hardin, The DevelopingLabor Law 1492 (3d
ed. 1992).
40. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 839, 400 P.2d 72, 79-80 (1965) (citing Wis. Stat. §
13.111.03 (1939) (repealed 1969)). Although the section cited by the court has been repealed, the
remainder of the statute is still in force, setting forth regulations similar in scope to the NLRA. See
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Finally, the Krystad court relied on Washington and federal law in
finding a substantive right where none had been explicitly granted. The
court stated that earlier Washington cases had established that public
policy provisions were more than simply aids to statutory construction.4
To refute the proposition that the legislature did not intend to grant rights
under the statute because it had not established a remedy, the court relied
on a U.S. Supreme Court case that found substantive rights in federal
legislation despite the absence of penalties in the statute for violating
such rights.42 Consequently, the court held that the public policy
provision granted substantive rights, in spite of its placement in the
preamble to the statute, where such rights were not typically granted.43
However, the Krystad decision was controversial, and was criticized at
4
the time as the product ofjudicial activism.
Although not addressed by the court, an important outcome of Krystad
is that it provides protection to agricultural workers. Washington's little
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not distinguish between different types of
workers.45 Consequently, the statute applies equally well to both
agricultural workers and laundry workers; whereas the NLRA
specifically excludes such workers.46 Washington thus became one of
the first states to protect the right of agricultural workers to engage in
47
concerted activity.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.04 (West 1988) (defining rights of employees); § 111.06 (defining unfair labor
practices); § 111.07 (providing remedies for unfair labor practices).
41. Krystad, 65 Wash. 2d at 839-40, 400 P.2d at 80-81 (citing, e.g., Audubon Homes, Inc. v.
Spokane Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 49 Wash. 2d 145, 298 P.2d 1112 (1956), cert. denied,354
U.S. 942 (1957); City of Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564,94 P.2d 180 (1939)).
42. Id. at 840-41, 400 P.2d at 80-81 (citing Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (finding employer's practice of establishing company union and
disbanding employees' union illegal and actionable under the Railway Labor Act, 63 Stat. 107
(1949), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1988))).
43. Id. at 846, 400 P.2d at 83.
44. See Cornelius J.Peck, Judicial Creativity and State Labor Law, 40 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 754
(1965). The opinion was particularly striking as it was a break from earlier decisions limiting the
reach of other provisions of the statute as an unconstitutional infringement on the power of the
courts. See Adams v. Building Serv.Employees Int'l Union, Local No. 6, 197 Wash. 242, 247, 84
P.2d 1021, 1023 (1938) (holding that legislature may not divest courts of jurisdiction to issue
restraining order); Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 412, 63 P.2d 397, 404
(1936) (holding provision of little Norris-LaGuardia Act that prohibits courts from granting
injunctions to be contrary to the state constitution).
45. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32 (1994).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988) (excluding agricultural laborers from definition of employee for the
purposes of the provisions of the Act).
47. As evidence of the controversial nature of inclusion of agricultural workers in a labor statute,
a legal consultant for the employer in Krystad suggested using the fact that the decision to protect
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Krystad and the PublicPolicy ProvisionReaffirmed

The Krystad holding remains an important protection for workers in
Washington State not covered by the NLRA. While Wisconsin and the
federal government have enacted comprehensive labor schemes to
obviate the recognition of substantive rights frorm public policy
provisions,48 Washington workers remain dependent on the rights
enunciated by the Krystad court. Consequently, opinions since Krystad
have reaffirmed its holding but have declined to extend its reach.4 9
In 1974, the Washington Supreme Court held in InternationalUnion
of OperatingEngineers Local No. 286 v. Sand Point Country Club that
while the public policy provision of the little Norris-LaGuardia Act
prevented interference with an employee's designation of
representatives, the provision did not mandate that the employer bargain
with the representatives." The court declined to require employers to
bargain with the union because there was no specific: language in the
public policy section to support such a requirement.5 1 The court
distinguished Krystadby stating that in that case, the court was providing
a remedy for a right recognized in the statute.52
The Sand Pointcourt recognized the balancing that the legislature had
performed in providing organized labor a manner in which they could
effectively bargain with an employer, while otherwise leaving the
complex field of labor relations to the bargaining parties. 3 The court
the workers would apply to agricultural workers as an argument against the court's eventual
interpretation. Telephone Interview with Cornelius J. Peck, Professor Emeritus, University of
Washington School of Law (July 5, 1994). Since the Krystad decision, several states have enacted
statutes specifically protecting the rights of agricultural workers. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 1140
(West 1989) (adopting Agricultural Labor Relations Act); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 21.377-1(3) (1985)
(adopting act similar to NLRA but failing to exclude agricultural workers from definition of
employee). Washington, however, has not enacted any statute expressly protecting the rights of
agricultural workers to organize.
48. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111 (West 1988); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
49. These cases may alleviate concerns that the logical extension of Krystadwould allow courts to
read into the public policy section other protections offered by the NLF.A, such as creating an
affirmative duty on employers to bargain in good faith. For a presentatien of these concerns see
Peck, supra note 44, at 764-65.
50. 83 Wash. 2d 498, 519 P.2d 985 (1974). The employees in Sand Point were golf course
maintenance workers, and the parties agreed that the NLRB had declined jurisdiction over such
enterprises. Id. at 498-99, 519 P.2d at 986.
51. Id. at 500, 519 P.2d at 987.
52. Id. at 501, 519 P.2d at 987. A more recent decision has also cited Krvstad for the proposition
that even where not indicated in the statute, the court must construct a remedy for violation of rights
within a statute. Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 920,784 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1990).
53. Sand Point, 83 Wash. 2d at 502-03, 519 P.2d at 988.
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echoed the Krystad court's concern that the individual worker be
provided with some means of organizing, thereby securing a more
equitable bargaining position with his employer. Because the employer
in Sand Point had not threatened or interfered in any way with its
employees' designation of representatives for bargaining, the court
affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant.' The Sand Point court
also reasoned that the Krystad opinion did not rely solely on the public
policy provision in finding substantive rights for workers, but also
looked to the statute as a whole. Therefore, according to the Sand Point
court, the Krystad court had not held that the public policy provision was
a source of substantive law. Rather, the court concluded that Krystad
had held that the public policy provision made it clear that the legislature
had intended the statute as a whole to prohibit interference in joining
labor organizations."
Despite the Sand Point court's apparent limitation of Krystad,
subsequent case law has specifically indicated that Sand Pointin no way
undermined the holding of Krystad or the import of the public policy
provision. For example, in Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union,
Local No. 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 6 the Washington Supreme Court
reaffirmed Krystad's essential holding that an employer cannot interfere
with an employee's choice of representation.5 7 The court in Culinary
Workers prohibited an employer from designating who would represent
employees in bargaining for wages, benefits, and work conditions.58 The
court held that the employer had violated the public policy provision by
unilaterally agreeing to recognize one union and to discharge those
employees who failed to join it. 9 However, as pointed out by the Bravo
court, the Culinary Workers case and other Washington cases

54. Id. at 502, 506-07, 519 P.2d at 988, 990.
55. Id. at 506, 519 P.2d at 990. Conversely, Chief Justice Hale would have required employers to
bargain in good faith because he felt that doing so would merely be giving effect to the statutory
provision-i.e., that giving employees the right to bargain without requiring the employer to at least
meet with them was a meaningless right. Id. at 510-11,519 P.2d at 992 (Hale, C.J., dissenting).
56. 91 Wash. 2d 353, 588 P.2d 1334 (1979).
57. Id. at 370, 588 P.2d at 1345.
58. Id. at 370-71, 588 P.2d at 1345. The court considered various provisions of a settlement
agreement entered into by an employer and employees setting up a pension trust fund, designating a
union as bargaining agent, and providing for benefits. The court generally upheld the agreement, but
invalidated the particular clause designating a union to represent the employees and promising to
discharge those employees who did notjoin. Id. at 357, 371,588 P.2d at 1338, 1345.
59. Id. at 370, 588 P.2d at 1345. The court noted that while employees may designate one union
as their bargaining agent, thereby binding future employees, an employer may not unilaterally agree
to recognize only one particular union. Id.
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interpreting the public policy provision involved union activity.'
Nevertheless, an analysis of federal authority shows that the Krystad
rationale is equally applicable to nonunion members.
C.

FederalCase Law

Because no Washington case other than Bravo addresses the issue of
whether nonunion members are entitled to the protection of the public
policy provision, analogous federal legislation and ease law provide
helpful analysis in this area. While interpretations of federal statutes by
federal courts are not binding on state courts, Washington courts have
generally looked to the jurisdictions from which legislation is borrowed
as an aid to statutory construction.6' Since Washington's labor law is
based in part on federal legislation, a discussion of federal law is
warranted.62 Additionally, legislative history reveals that the agricultural
worker exclusion in the NLRA was most likely a matter of expediency.63
Therefore, looking to federal law for guidance in applying Washington's
little Norris-LaGuardia Act to farm workers is not only helpful, but
warranted. Federal case law suggests not only that the NLRA grants
protection to nonunion members, but that in some cases courts afford
more latitude to actions of nonunion workers than union workers,
specifically because they are unorganized.

60. Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 71 Wash. App. 769, 776, 862 P.2d 623, 628 (1993) (citing Krystad v.
Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965)); Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union, Local 596 v.
Gateway Cafe, Inc,, 91 Wash. 2d 353, 583 P.2d 1334 (1979); International Union of Operating
Eng'rs Local 286 v. Sand Point Country Club, 83 Wash. 2d 498, 519 P.2d 985 (1974)), review
granted,124 Wash. 2d 1001 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 610 P.2d 857 '1980) (adopting federal
doctrine of disparate treatment and disparate impact in interpreting Washington discrimination law),
modified, 621 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1981); Juanita Bay Valley Community As;'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wash.
App. 59, 68-69, 510 P.2d 1140, 1146-47 (1973) (looking to federal law in interpreting State
Environmental Protection Act patterned after the National Environmental Protection Act); State v.
Carroll, 81 Wash. 2d 95, 109, 500 P.2d 115, 123 (1972) (adopting federal interpretation of
conspiracy statute borrowed from federal law). See also Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 839-40,
400 P.2d 72, 80 (looking to federal interpretation of analogous legislation due to lack of controlling
authority).
62. See State v. Board of Trustees, 93 Wash. 2d 60, 605 P.2d 1252 (1980) (looking to NLRA for
appropriate remedies under Washington's Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, which court
found similar to NLRA).
63. See infra part I.C.I.
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1.

Legislative History of the NLRA andAgricultural Workers

While the NLRA expressly exempts agricultural workers from its
provisions,' the legislative history suggests that these workers were
excluded only for reasons involving political expedience. 5 The Senate
hearings on the bill contain no explanation of why agricultural workers
were excluded. 6 The only mention of a policy supporting the exclusion
of farm workers in the. Senate debate tellingly comes from a brief filed
by the Washington representative of the National Grange. 7 The majority
report of the House of Representatives likewise made no reference to the
policy behind the agricultural exclusion,68 nor did any subsequent reports
discussing and passing the bill give a reason for the exclusion.69
However, debates on the bill suggest that even those wishing to exclude
agricultural workers from the bill nevertheless felt that such workers
merited protection to engage in labor activities.7" Thus, the legislative
history of the NLRA gives no indication that the exclusion of agricultural

64, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
65. Cong. Research Serv., Legislative History of the Exclusion of Agricultural Employees from
the NationalLaborRelations Act, 1935 and the FairLabor StandardsAct of 1938 at LRS 1-2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at LRS 3. The brief suggested that it would be unfair to force farmers, who were often
poor themselves, to be burdened by the labor requirements of the NLRA. Id. The National Grange
is an American farmers' organization formed in 1867 to preserve the rights of farmers. The Grange
has been instrumental in passing legislation protecting the rights of farmers. Thomas A. Woods,
Knights of the Plow: Oliver H. Kelley and the Originsof the Grangein Republican Ideology at xv,
xxi (1991).
68. Recommendation ofthe House Committee on Labor,June 10, 1935, reprintedin Koretz, supra
note 7, at 301. The minority report, on the other hand, contained strenuous objections to the
exclusion of agricultural workers, stating "[ilt is a matter of plain fact that the worst conditions in the
United States are the conditions among the agricultural workers ....
I, therefore, respectfully
submit that there is not a single solitary reason why agricultural workers should not be included
under the provisions of this bill." Id. at 301-06.
69. Cong. Research Serv., supra note 65, at LRS 6.
70. For example, the Chairman of the House Committee on Labor stated:
We hope that the agricultural workers eventually will be taken care of.... [C]ertainly I am
in favor of giving the agricultural workers every protection, but just now I believe in biting off
one mouthful at a time. If we can get this bill through and get it working properly, there will be
opportunity later, and I hope soon, to take care of the agricultural workers.

...
[I]f the gentleman asks me personally how I feel about the organization of agricultural
workers, I certainly hope they will organize just the same as industrial workers.

79 Cong. Rec. 9721 (1935) (statement of Rep. Connery), reprintedin Cong. Research Serv., supra
note 65, at LRS 7.
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workers was one of principle or policy."
Accordingly, federal
interpretations of the NLRA provide a useful tool for an analysis of
Washington's analogous state legislation, even in cases such as the
present one, which involve agricultural workers.
2.

FederalCourtsInterpretingthe NLRA

Federal courts interpreting the NLRA72 have not required that workers
be members of a union before gaining the protection of the statute.73 In
fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted more latitude to the actions of
nonunion workers in determining whether they have complied with the
requirements of the NLRA. 4 In following this decision, federal circuit
courts have reinforced that the NLRA guarantees rights to union and
nonunion members alike.75
The NLRA, a successor statute to the Norris-LaGuarlia Act, contains
language related to concerted activities of employees nearly identical to
the public policy provision of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia
Act. 76 In section 7, the NLRA grants employees the right to selforganize, to form labor organizations, and to engage in concerted
activities.77 Section 8 forbids employers from interfiring with these
71. See Cong. Research Serv., supra note 65, at LRS 16-17.
72. While Washington's public policy provision is borrowed from the federal Norris-LaGuardia
Act; federal interpretations of that statute have focused on its effect on the court's power to grant
injunctions. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
346 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that policy of Norris-LaGuardia Act was to prevent injunctive
interference in labor disputes, thereby allowing labor controversies to be settled through negotiation
and the free play of economic forces). However, federal courts have not considered the issue of
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act grants substantive rights because just two years after enactment of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress passed the NLRA, which provided for more specific remedies
for employees engaging in concerted activities. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452
(1935) (current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1988)). Accordingly, federal law
interpreting the NLRA will be addressed here as it is more relevant to -:is analysis than that
interpreting the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
73. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Halstead Metal Prods. v. NLRB, 940 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1991).
76. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1673, 1681-82 (1989). See infra notes 134-38 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the differences in the two statutes.
77. The provision in whole reads: ,
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist lebor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
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rights and outlines other prohibited practices. 8 Both section 7 of the
NLRA and the public policy provision of the little Norris-LaGuardia Act
concern the protection of the unorganized worker.79
Federal courts have not required that an employee be a member of a
union before obtaining the protections of section 7 of the NLRA. In
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum

Co., 80

the U.S.

Supreme

Court

unanimously held that several workers had engaged in concerted activity
when they refused to work in a plant with inadequate heating on a
particularly cold day.8 ' The workers were not members of a union and
did not designate a representative. They merely joined together and
decided that they could not work under the conditions in the plant.82
When the foreman discovered that they had gone home, the employer
discharged all of the workers.8
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the employer had violated sections
of the NLRA that provided employees the right to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection.84 The Court reasoned that the term
"concerted activities" must be given broad interpretation to give effect to
Congress's intent to protect workers.8 Noting that the workers were
wholly unorganized, the Court concluded that they should not have been
expected to make formal demands to their employer before leaving in
protest of the working conditions. 6 This holding provides greater
protection to workers who are unorganized, as organized workers may be
required to present such a formal demand. 7 The court therefore declined
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
78. Id. § 158.
79. The public policy provision explicitly addresses the situation of "the individual unorganized
worker [who] is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor." Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994). Section 7 of the NLRA grants workers the right to
self-organization. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
80. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
81. Id. at 11, 17.
82. Id. at 11-12.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 12-13 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157).
85. Id. at 17.
86. Id. at 14-15.
87. Indeed, the Court of Appeals decision that was reversed by Washington Aluminum based its
rejection of the workers' claim on the fact that they had not presented a formal demand, citing a list
of cases where workers made such formal demands before engaging in a walk-out. NLRB3 v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 291 F.2d 869, 877 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1961).
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to require workers to join an official union in order to improve their
bargaining position through the NLRA.
This principle that nonunion workers are particularly entitled to the
protections of the NLRA has been reiterated by federal circuit courts."
In a recent case, HalsteadMetal Products v. NLRB, 9 the Fourth Circuit
held that a walkout of unorganized workers similar to that in Washington
Aluminum warranted special protection from the Ac: as a concerted
activity." The workers had gathered at an oak tree to protest a proposed
schedule change, and telephoned an employee who had recently resigned
because he could not work during the proposed hours.' The employer
agreed to a compromise on the schedule change, but refased to rehire the
employee who had resigned, allegedly because he had attended the
protest.92 The court reasoned that because unorganized workers must
attempt to engage in concerted activities without the help of organized
labor, they needed the Act's protection even more than unionized
workers.93
D.

The Bravo Decision

Notwithstanding that background of state and federal law, the
Washington Court of Appeals, in Bravo v. Dolsen Cov., 94 held that the
public policy provision of Washington's little Norri,,-LaGuardia Act

88. As early as 1949, courts recognized that the NLRA protected the concerted activities of
nonunion workers. See Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1949)
(agreeing that "the 'concerted activities' protected by the act are not limited to cases where the
employees are acting through unions or otherwise formally organized").
89. 940 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1991).
90. See id. at 70-71. Other cases that have held similar activities by nonunion workers protected
include NLRB v. McEver Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding protection under NLRA
for nonunion workers who engaged in work stoppage to protest dangerous conditions of work;
allowing protection despite no formal demand as called for in the NLRA); E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983) (restating right of protection for nonunion workers
who act as part of group); and Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 622 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding
protection under NLRA for four unorganized workers who participated in walkout to present
grievances to management).
91. Halstead,940 F.2d at 68-69.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 70.
94. 71 Wash. App. 769, 862 P.2d 623 (1993), review granted,124 Wash. 2d 1001 (1994).
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applied only in cases involving union activity." In holding that the
Dolsen Companies had not violated the public policy provision, the court
relied on the fact that Krystad and other cases interpreting the provision
had all been cases involving unions.96 The Bravo court also read the
language of the public policy provision, that workers were to be free
from interference in organizing and designating representatives, to
include only union activity.97 The court found no authority under state or
federal law to extend the concept of "concerted activities" to a nonunion
strike or picket line.98 Consequently, because the strike in Bravo did not
involve union activity, the court found no violation of the provision.99
II.

BRAVO LEAVES NONUNION WORKERS INADEQUATELY
PROTECTED

In declaring that the public policy provision applied only in cases
involving union activity, the Bravo court incorrectly interpreted
Washington's labor statutes and case law and created a decision at odds
with persuasive federal authority and public policy concerns. The court
failed to recognize the intent of the public policy provision of the little
Norris-LaGuardia Act: that workers be allowed to gain stronger

95. Id. at 778, 862 P.2d at 629. For a summary of the facts of the case, see supra text
accompanying note 1. The dairy workers did not have a remedy under the NLRA because, as
agricultural workers, they were explicitly excluded from the Act. Bravo, 71 Wash. App. at 773, 862
P.2d at 626 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)).
96. Id. at 776, 862 P.2d at 628. Although alleged in the workers' complaint, this Note does not
address in detail the separate tort of wrongful discharge contrary to a clearly enunciated public
policy. However, if the workers' discharge is seen as a statutory violation of the public policy
provision of the little Norris-LaGuardia Act, their claim for the tort of wrongful discharge would
most likely be preempted. See Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990)
(dismissing claim of wrongful discharge contrary to public policy because discharge specifically
covered by age discrimination statute). Likewise, if the workers' claim does not fall under the
provision, a court may feel, as the Court of Appeals did, that there is no clear statement of public
policy being violated. Bravo, 71 Wash. App. at 778, 862 P.2d at 629. Thus, the wrongful discharge
claim essentially begs the question of whether the public policy provision applies in this case.
97. Bravo, 71 Wash. App. at 774, 862 P.2d at 627 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020).
98. Id. at 776-77, 862 P.2d at 628.
99. Id. at 778, 862 P.2d at 629. While the court decided the issue based on the fact that there had
been no union involved in the dispute, there is evidence to the contrary. The workers had alleged
that Dolsen had refused to meet with their "representatives." Id. at 777, 862 P.2d at 628-29. On
appeal, the workers alleged that these representatives were in fact union members involved in the
strike. See Petition for Review to Washington Supreme Court, Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., No. 12600-5III, at 8 (submitted Feb. 1, 1994) (citing Reply Brief of Appellants at 10 n.1). However, the court
held that the complaint did not allege the fact of union involvement, so any evidence of such
involvement could not be considered. Bravo, 71 Wash. App. at 777, 862 P.2d at 628-29.
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bargaining positions with their employers."° Further, the court ignored
that the statute nowhere mentions a requirement of union activity.' ° The
court's decision is also contrary to Washington case law, which
recognizes the policy of allowing workers to be free from interference
from employers in engaging in concerted activities,0 2 and is inconsistent
with federal case law interpreting a similar provision, which does not
make a distinction between union and nonunion employees. 0 3 Unlike
these state and federal interpretations, the result reached by Bravo
unnecessarily narrows the choices of workers in attempting to effectively
bargain with their employers.
A.

The Bravo CourtIncorrectly Interpretedthe Statute

The Bravo court misinterpreted the public policy provision of
Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act by engrafting onto the plain
language of the statute a requirement for unions. Bravo's interpretation
runs contrary to the purpose of the statute: to allow workers more
effective bargaining positions with their employers. Further, the Bravo
decision is inconsistent with the language of the public policy provision.
Finally, by forcing workers to join unions in order to protect themselves,
the Bravo court also contradicts the language of the provision forbidding
interference with a worker's freedom to engage in protected activities.
Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia statute was designed to provide
an even playing field for employers and workers regardless of union
membership. In the preamble to the statute, the legislature declared its
intent, stating that it is necessary to protect a worker's attempts to
organize with other workers.'o 4 Nowhere in the public policy provision
of the statute does the legislature indicate that it was concerned only with
unionized workers.0 5 On the contrary, the language used is general in
scope and recognizes the necessity not only of "self-organization" and
"designation of representatives" but also of "other concerted

100. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
101. Id.
102. See supra part I.B.
103. See supra part I.C.
104. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994); supranote 24 and accompanying text.
105. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
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activities.' ' 6 Further, the provision read as a whole evinces a concern
for the bargaining position of the individual, unorganized worker.'0 7
That "self-organization" and the "designation of representatives"
necessarily involve organized labor unions is not self-evident from the
statute. Requiring the presence of a labor union would restrict the scope
of the statute with results contrary to the import of the words used by the
legislature.
Individual workers can organize and designate
representatives in many ways, such as by informally delegating one of
their number to speak for the rest. The artificial requirement of a union
would not allow a worker to choose from among the full range of options
and to determine the method best suited for bargaining with an employer.
Even if one were to accept that self-organization and designation of
representatives necessarily imply union involvement, the remainder of
the public policy provision allows for nonunion activity. The wording of
the statute indicates that "concerted activities" are considered separate
from the self-organization and designation of representation. By stating
that workers should be free from interference "in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities,"'0 8
the drafters set each category apart. Thus, "concerted activities"
encompass all that the term itself indicates. "Concerted" has been
defined as embracing the activities of employees who join together in
order to achieve common goals.'09 The statute thus provides for a
worker's freedom to engage in activities mutually planned with other
workers in order to bring about "mutual aid or protections."" That an
organized labor union may make concerted activity more effective does
not mean that such mutual planning can be achieved only through a
union. A plain reading of the statute should thus allow a worker to
choose whether to plan mutually with a union or with other nonunion
workers.
Furthermore, by forcing workers to join unions in order to protect
themselves, the Bravo court's reading would turn the provision on its
head, causing the provision itself to interfere with an individual's
freedom of self-representation and designation of representatives. In
106. Id.
107. See supra note 24 for the full text of the public policy provision.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984). See also NLRB v. Peter Cailler
Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942) (including within concerted activities the
action of workmen in a shop making common cause with a fellow workman over his separate
grievance).
110. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
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many areas, there may be only one union available for workers to join.
In such cases, Bravo would require the worker to joirt a union to have
any protection for concerted activities, essentially depriving a worker of
a meaningful choice. Also, the public policy provision specifically
allows a worker freedom to decline to associate with other workers."'
The narrow reading of the Bravo court, in direct contrast to these words
of the provision, does not allow workers the freedom to decline to
associate with unions if they wish to gain freedom of contract through
concerted action.
B.

Bravo Is Contraryto Washington Case Law

In addition to misinterpreting the statute, the Bravo court wrongly
limited Krystad and the subsequent cases applying the Krystad rule.
Contrary to the conclusion of the Bravo court, the principles set forth in
Krystad apply with equal force to nonunion workers. The Bravo court
also unfairly limits cases decided after Krystad that provide protection to
workers who have not yet organized into a union ard recognize that
Krystad was founded on the broad principle of protecting employee
bargaining power. Finally, Krystad should not be narrowly read because
the legislature has implicitly approved of its holding by failing to enact
contrary legislation throughout the opinion's twenty-nine year existence.
Although the Krystad court held that employees could not be
discharged due to their union activities,112 the broad principles espoused
by the court apply equally well to nonunion workers. The Krystad court
was deciding a case involving a discharge because of union activities and
thus did not consider nonunion workers."' However, the court stated
that the right to join a union was only one of the rights that the public
policy provision granted to employees, suggesting that the provision
granted other rights."4 The Krystad court further noted that the words of
the statute, taken as substantive rights, were consistent with the
remainder of the statute providing workers freedom in choosing
representatives without interference from their employer." 5 The Bravo
court's requirement of union activity to trigger the protections of the
statute restricts this freedom of choice.
11. Id.
112. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72, 83 (1965).
113. Id. at 829, 400 P.2d at 73.
114. Id. at 846, 400 P.2d at 83.
115. Id. at 844-45, 400 P.2d at 83.
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The Bravo court's holding that Krystad should be strictly limited to
discharges based on union activities is also contrary to Washington case
law, which demands a wider interpretation. In Culinary Workers, the
Washington Supreme Court recognized the broader principle upon which
Krystad was founded, that an employer cannot interfere with its
employees' designation of a representative." 6 Although a union was
involved in Culinary Workers, its rationale would prevent nonunion
workers from being forced into a union chosen by an employer. By
holding that an employer may not threaten to discharge employees who
failed to join a union, the Culinary Workers court implicitly recognized
that an employee does not have to be a member of a union in order to
17
gain the protections of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia statute
The Sand Point decision further reiterates the theme of the public
policy provision, stating that its purpose was to facilitate the achievement
of an effective bargaining position for workers." 8 The Sand Pointcourt,
like the Krystad court, phrased the employees' rights in terms of union
activities. However, the court was not addressing the issue of nonunion
activities." 9
Moreover, allowing an employer to interfere with
employees' rights merely because the employee had not joined a union
would be inconsistent with Sand Point's reiteration of the legislature's
concern for workers to have an effective bargaining position.
There is no indication that the legislature has abandoned this concern.
Krystad was decided more than twenty-five years ago,12 and the
Washington legislature must be aware of its holding. The Washington
Supreme Court has recognized that the legislature may implicitly
condone a judicial interpretation of a statute by failing to change the
court's determination of the statute's meaning.'
In Buchanan v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters," the court held that an
interpretation of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act that had stood
for seventeen years was presumed to be known by the legislature, whose

116. Culinary Workers & Bartenders Union, Local No. 596 v. Gateway Cafe, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d
353, 370, 588 P.2d 1334, 1345 (1979). See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
117. The court applied the public policy provision even though only one of the employees was a
union member. Id. at 370,588 P.2d at 1345.
118. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 286 v. Sand Point Country Club, 83
Wash. 2d 498,502,519 P.2d 985,988 (1974).
119. Id.
120. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827,400 P.2d 72 (1965).
121. Buchanan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 94 Wash. 2d 508, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980).
122. 94 Wash. 2d 508, 617 P.2d 1004 (1980).
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inaction showed that it concurred with the interpretation. 23 Thus, even if
the Krystad opinion could have been questioned at the time it was
decided, its survival throughout twenty-nine years of legislative sessions
supports the soundness of its policy. 24 Consequently, the holding of
Krystad and its progeny should not be narrowed so as to contradict the
legislature's intent in enacting the policy provision.
C.

The Bravo Decision Is Inconsistent with FederalLaw

The same policy concerns of the Washington legislature are also
reflected in federal interpretations of the NLRA. Federal courts have
long recognized the importance of protecting the concerted activities of
nonunion workers."2 Washington Aluminum reflected the U.S. Supreme
Court's view of the purpose of section 7 of the NLRA, which is to
protect the self-organization and concerted activities of workers.
Likewise, Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia statute, as interpreted by
Krystad, protects the self-organization and concerted activities of
workers. Washington should therefore recognize the rationale of the
Supreme Court in providing protection to nonunion workers, particularly
where they are unorganized.' 26
Not only is the reasoning of Washington Aluminum sound, but
Washington's traditional deference to federal interpretations of similar
statutes is justified in this case. The NLRA contains a descendant of the
public policy provision from the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act,'27 and
Washington's public policy provision and section 7 cf the NLRA have
the same purpose, protecting the unorganized worker. 2 Moreover, the
differences between the NLRA and Washington's public policy
123. Id. at 511, 617 P.2d at 1006. See also Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title
Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 789, 719 P.2d 531, 537 (1986) (finding that failure of legislature to
change judicial interpretation of statute for ten years indicates legislative approval); State v. Fenter,
89 Wash. 2d 57, 569 P.2d 67 (1977) (finding that statute not expressly overruling holding of
previous case did not intend to change law because legislature must have known of previous
holding). But see Pringle v. State, 77 Wash. 2d 569, 573, 464 P.2d 425, 427-28 (1970) (stating that
rule of legislative silence indicating approval applies only when statute is ambiguous and legislature
has considered issue subsequent to court interpretation).
124. In any case, the Washington Court of Appeals that decided Bravo was required to follow
Krystad as binding precedent and thus should have respected the supreme court's reasoning. While
the Supreme Court of Washington may overrule its previous decision, the soundness of its original
interpretation and the subsequent legislative inaction indicate that the decisibn should stand.
125. See supranotes 89-91 and accompanying text.
126. See supranote 84-87 and accompanying text.
127. See Morris,supra note 76, at 1681-432.
128. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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provision are not sufficiently substantive to deprive an entire class of
workers of this important protection. The differences between the
statutes include that while section 7 of the NLRA is within a section of
the statute specifically granting employee rights, 29 Washington's public
policy provision is contained within the preamble.1 30 However, the
Krystad opinion minimized this distinction by holding that the public
policy provision grants substantive rights to employees.13 ' Thus, the two
sections of the statutes effect the same outcome.3 2 Also, while the
NLRA provides for specific remedies if the employee's enumerated
rights are violated, Washington's public policy provision does not
mention remedies. 3 3 Again, the Krystad court felt that the lack of a
remedy should not bar courts from providing one. 34 Therefore, the two
statutes remain similar in the area of protecting the rights of employees
to organize, designate representatives, and engage in concerted activities.
Finally, the reasons why agricultural workers were excluded from the
NLRA do not provide a persuasive reason not to use federal
interpretations of the NLRA when considering disputes involving such
workers. 135 Consequently, the rationale of federal interpretations should
apply equally to agricultural and non-agricultural workers who must
resort to state labor law.
D.

Bravo Is Inconsistentwith EquitableLaborPolicy

Not only is Bravo inconsistent with federal law, but the Bravo
decision also forecloses the option of concerted activity for a significant

129. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
130. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994). NLRA § 7, entitled "Right of employees as to
organization, collective bargaining, etc.," lists the rights of employees to organize and to engage in
other concerted activities. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The language of Washington's statute is
contained in a provision entitled "Policy enunciated" and discusses similar activities. Wash. Rev.
Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
131. Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72, 83 (1965). Washington case law also
indicates that the name of the statute does not necessarily dictate its meaning. See Treffry v. Taylor,
67 Wash. 2d 487, 491,408 P.2d 269, 272 (1965) (holding that the title to a bill need not be an index
to its contents, but it must give notice of its purpose so as to lead to reasonable inquiry by those
affected), appealdismissed,385 U.S. I0 (1966).
132. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.32.020 (1994).
134. K-ystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 827, 840-41,400 P.2d 72, 80-81 (1965). See also supranotes
41-43 and accompanying text.
135. See discussion suprapart I.C.1.
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class of people. 136 Since Washington has no comprehensive labor
relations statute, the public policy provision of Washington's little
Norris-LaGuardia Act remains the sole means for many workers like
Bravo to be free from interference in attempting to bargain with
employers as a group. If this provision is rendered meaningless for
nonunion workers, a significant number of workers will be powerless to
oppose the very dangers and deplorable situations that the legislature
sought to address when enacting the statute.
Another unjust consequence of the Bravo decision will be to force
workers into choosing union membership as the only means by which
they can effectively bargain with their employers. Not only does this
result conflict with the language of the public policy -provision,137 but it
also can have particularly harmful effects in certain situations. If no
union is available for workers to join, the worker is left with no
protection against the superior economic bargaining position of an
employer. If a union is available, a worker may not wish to join a union
for political, personal, or practical reasons. Other workers may not
believe that a union is the best way to associate in order to bargain with
an employer. Still others may feel that a particular union is not
concerned with their interests, colludes with the employer for personal
financial gain, or is motivated by other influences corrupting its
representation of employees. Further, employees may wish to form an
independent union for bargaining* with an individual employer. The
Bravo holding does not allow employees to make such choices.
III.

STATE LABOR LAW FOR THE FUTURE

Washington courts should interpret its little Norris-.LaGuardia Act to
protect workers' abilities to engage in concerted activities, regardless of
union affiliation. In order to grant workers the protection necessary to
have freedom of contract, Washington's public policy provision must
cover as broad a scope of employees as possible. Accordingly, nonunion
workers should be granted the same protection under state labor law as
union workers. Courts should thus continue to interpret the public policy
provision of Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act to provide
protection to the individual worker. Courts must recognize, however,
136. Only fourteen percent of private-sector employees in 1990 were represented by a union.
Michael H. Gottesman, Whither Goest Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 Yale
L.J. 2767, 2767 n.l (1991) (reviewing Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of
Labor and Employment Law (1990)).
137. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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that in order to be fully effective, the Act must apply to all workers in the
state not covered by federal law. Only then can a worker truly be free to
choose how and whether to engage in concerted activities.
Failing such an interpretation, Washington should follow the example
of other states that have enacted more comprehensive labor relations
statutes. 38 Such a statute should specifically grant workers the right to
engage in concerted activity.'3 9 Additional issues to be addressed in a
labor relations statute, while beyond the scope of this paper, would
include the creation of a labor relations board to decide disputes, whether
to compel good faith bargaining on the part of the employer, and
determination of other unfair labor practices. 40

[Editors' Note: On January 26, 1995, after this edition of Washington
Law Review was in final form, the Supreme Court of Washington
reversed the Court of Appeals decision in an opinion that reflects much
of the analysis in the foregoing Note.t]

138. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 1140 (West 1989); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 21.377 (1985); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 111.01 (West 1988). Indeed most states have passed labor relations statutes modeled after
the NLRA. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization,7 Yale J. on Reg. 355, 369 n.59 (1990).
139. The statute can be modeled after the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with an employee's efforts to engage in concerted activity. 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1988). As discussed above, such a prohibition does not depend on union involvement. See supra
part I.C.
140. Examples of other unfair labor practices include regulation of picketing and boycotts,
coercing union membership for particular employees, and certification procedures for bargaining
agents. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988) (defining unfair labor practices under the NLRA).
t Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 1995 Wash. LEXIS 53 (Jan. 26, 1995).

